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At the time of Argentina´s greenhouse gases emissions reduction voluntary commitment, most of 
the articles on intensity targets had not been published. The aim of this paper is to (re)discuss 
briefly the proposal made by Argentina taking into account that literature. To justify the adopted 
target form and stringency, we compare fixed and dynamic targets in terms of the likelihood of “hot 
air”, the relationship between allowed emissions and GDP, the link between abatement and GDP, 
and outcomes´ dispersion. But, the assumptions implicit in the design of the target may change 
those properties. We show how the BAU scenario taken as reference and the level of emissions 
reduction  affects  targets´  design  and  characteristics.  Finally,  considering  different  emissions 
projections, we perform a comparison between allowed emissions and projected ones during the 
first  half  commitment  period  (2008-2010),  concluding  that  compliance  with  the  commitment 
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I.  Introduction 
 
There is no doubt that anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions increase is one of the 
greatest challenges of this century. Both developed and developing countries contribute to it. In fact, 
the biggest emitter (including land use and forestry) is China (17%), in the second place are the 
United States (16.1%), and both were followed by Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, India and Japan (data 
for  2005,  from  WRI  2011).  However,  this  ranking  changes  when  historical  emissions  are 
considered. According to Baumert et al. (2005), United States leads with a 29.3% of measurable 
historical emissions (1850-2002), and is followed by Russia (8.1%) and China (7.6%). In both 
orderings, Argentina contributes less than 1% of total emissions, but this low percentage should be 
interpreted carefully as Argentina is included among the 25 largest emitters in WRI (2011).  
In 1999, at the Fifth Conference of Parties (COP 5), Argentina announced an emissions 
reduction target (SAyDS, 1999). At that moment, this was an innovative event because it was the 
first time that a developing country had agreed to meet a voluntary quantified GHG limitation 
target. Argentina´s proposal pursued mainly two objectives (Barros and Conte Grand, 2002): trying 
to contribute to the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in a context of a very difficult international 
negotiation process, and gain access to all the market mechanisms under the Protocol (and not only 
to  the  Clean  Development  Mechanism).  In  addition  to  being  the  first  developing  country  to 
announce a GHG reduction, Argentina´s target originality was that it was linked to GDP. This 
means that it did not lock to a fixed emission level as the commitments adopted by developed 
countries  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol,  but  rather,  allowed  emissions  to  depend  on  economic 
development. Back in 1999, only a few publications had begun to discuss that kind of alternatives 
(see Baumert et al., 1999).
1  
The  economic  crisis  in  Argentina  in  2002  and  the  subsequent  change  in  the  local 
government removed the proposal from the debate. The target was resisted by the new national 
authorities that were elected just before COP5. Part of that resistance derived from the opposite 
political sign of the new government, which was less willing to contribute to the United States claim 
that there should be “meaningful participation” of developing countries to abate carbon emissions. 
Another reason for abandoning the initiative came from the pressure of other developing countries 
which argumented that the target would be in conflict with development objectives. Nevertheless, 
the  analysis  of  Argentina´s  proposal  remains  a  valuable  exercise  that  can  contribute  to  enrich 
academic discussions on emissions dynamic targets.   
                                                 
1 Since 1999 the literature on intensity targets has flourished (Frankel 1999, Lutter 2000, Philibert and Pershing 2001, 
Kim and Baumert 2002, Ellerman and Sue Wing 2003, Kolstad 2005, Pizer 2005, Marschinski and Edenhofer 2010, to 
name a few).   3 
When reading the more recent literature, there is a great emphasis on whether or not 
dynamic targets are superior to fixed ones. Formal assessments of those particularities have being 
studied in Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003), Kolstad (2005), Sue Wing et al. (2009) and Marschinski 
and  Edenhofer (2010), for  example.  However, as  several  authors  have  already  made  clear, the 
superiority of intensity caps over absolute limits depends on “parameter values” (as explicitly noted 
in Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010), on certain “conditions” (as pointed out in Sue Wing et al., 
2009) or on “model assumptions” (as emphasized clearly by Tian and Whalley, 2009). This paper 
wants to contribute to that assertion by showing how the properties of Argentina´s intensity target 
do depend on its design. This refers to another dimension of uncertainty, the one related to the 
design of the target. As a secondary result, this article makes a preliminary assessment on what 
would be Argentina´s situation if the proposed target had been binding, and how would that state of 
affairs if certain key assumption had been different. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses Argentina’s proposal design. It 
compares allowed emissions and abatement resulting from fixed and alternative dynamic targets.  
This same section also deals with the targets´ characteristics in terms of the likelihood of “hot air”,
 2 
the shape of the relationship between allowed emissions/emissions reductions and GDP, as well as 
the resulting dispersion between the levels of effort needed to comply with the commitment. Section 
III  shows  how  targets´  properties  change  when  the  design  implies  different  projections  over 
emissions in the future, or when the stringency of the target varies. Finally, Section IV compares 
actual emissions with what would have been the allowed one if the target had been binding in the 
period 2008 to 2010 and Section V concludes.  
 
II.  Argentina´s GHG target design back in 1999 
 
In 1997 Argentina presented its First National Communication (FNC) to UNFCCC, which included 
GHG  inventories  for  1990  and  1994  (SAyDS,  1997).  During  the  years  1998  and  1999,  the 
Secretariat of Environment and Sustainable Development of Argentina coordinated a technical team 
that defined a GHG target, which was announced during COP 5 in Germany. 
 
II. 1.  Argentina´s GHG emissions 
 
At the time of the target´s design, the most updated GHG inventory was the one included in the 
revised FNC (submitted to UNCCC in 1999), with a revision of the 1990 and 1994 inventories and 
                                                 
2 The so-called “hot air” occurs when actual emissions turn out to be lower than the allowed ones (i.e., A < 0).   4 
with a new inventory for the year 1997 (SAyDS, 1999). As is documented in SAyDS (1999) and 
Barros  and  Conte  Grand  (2002),  Argentina´s  1997  GHG  emissions  were  76.8  Metric  Tons  of 
Carbon Equivalent (MTCE). The energy sector and agriculture sector represented jointly 91% of 
GHG emissions, while the rest of the emissions came from industry (3%) and waste generation 
(6%). Total emissions had increased 14% between 1990 and 1994, and 7% between 1994 and 1997 
(see Figure 1). 
 
































Energy Livestock Crops Waste Industry  
Source: Own elaboration based on SAyDS (1999). 
Notes: The Energy sector does not include Energy emissions from the Agriculture sector, which are included under 
Crops. Industry includes HFCs, PFCs and SF6 in 1997.  
 
 
GHG in Argentina are strongly linked to the activities that emit those gases. These activity 
levels, in turn, maintain a close relation with the country’s macroeconomic evolution as measured 
by the GDP. However, the agricultural sector is not as strongly “coupled” to GDP as are the rest of 
the sectors (energy, industry and waste management). As stated in Barros and Conte Grand (2002, 
p.559), “This is in great part because Argentina is a country that is a price-taker (and “conditions-
taker") in international markets of crops and livestock products, so the prosperity of this sector 
depends more on the ups and downs of those markets that on own domestic conditions.” This means   5 
that it is possible to have years of expansion in the economy with a difficult situation in agriculture, 
as was the case between 1994 and 1997.
3  
 
II.  2. Target stringency and alternatives 
 
The adoption of a target implies reducing (abating) emissions. This reduction can be written as: 
 
A(t) = EBAU (t) − EP (t)                         (1) 
 
Where A(t) is the reduction of emissions (or abatement), EBAU(t) are the projected “Business as 
Usual” (BAU) average 2008-2012 emissions and EP(t) are the permitted (or allowed) emissions to 
comply with the commitment.
4 
  Adopting a target requires defining its stringency and its form (Herzog et al., 2006). In 
terms of its stringency, Argentina´s decision, based on its estimation of possible mitigation options, 
was to reduce 10% GHG levels with respect to the average 2008-2012 “more likely” BAU scenario. 
For the definition of the target, BAU emissions were estimated for nine alternative scenarios: three 
scenarios (high, middle and low growth) of the agriculture sector were combined with the three 
resulting scenarios of the economic sectors highly sensitive to GDP (energy, industry and waste 
management). The latter were based on projections of 2.3, 3.6 and 5.1 % average GDP growth rates 
from 1997 to 2012. Then, the scenario chosen as the reference (“more likely” scenario) was the 
middle GDP growth and high agricultural sector growth. Under that scenario, a reduction of 10% 
implies an annual average target of 11.165 MTCE for the period 2008-2012.  
In  terms  of  the  target´s  metric  (form),  Argentina´s  technical  team  considered  several 
options: 1) a fixed target, 2) a linear emission intensity target and 3) a “square root” GDP related 
target.
5 In the first case, the target is expressed in term of absolute (or percentage) reductions. For 
the latter options, the target is “dynamic”, since allowed emissions are indexed to GDP. As stated 
above, what was done in the case of Argentina was to define a λ% abatement with respect to the 
most likely (reference) BAU scenario for 2008-2012. Table 1 reports the formulae and conditions 
needed for all target alternatives to be equivalent to the same percentage reduction target. Note that 
                                                 
3 From 1994 to 1997, GDP increased from 250,308 to 277,441 million 1993 Argentine pesos, while emissions from 
agriculture remained almost constant over that period (31.2, 33.5 and 33.6 MTCE for 1990, 1994 and 1997 respectively). 
4 Note that EP(t) is what the Kyoto Protocol calls “initial assigned amounts” while EBAU(t) are emissions in the Protocol 
(1990) base year. Hence “initial assigned amounts” are base year emissions minus the reduction target.  
5 There are other metrics that are now discussed in the literature. For example, the “indexed target” in Kim and Baumert 
(2002) or the “growth-indexed emission limit” in Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003). Nevertheless, as stated above in the 
text, at the time of the design of Argentina´s target, most of the articles dealing with intensity targets had not been 
published.   6 
under dynamic targets, allowed emissions are positively linked to GDP (in general, it always hold 




EP : the derivative is equal to zero for fixed targets and greater than zero for the 












Table 1. Allowed emissions formulae for each type of target 
Target  EP   Conditions for equivalence with the percentage target* 
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Notes: 0<λ<1 is the percentage of reduction and q is a fixed amount of emission reduction. * These conditions were 
determined by the combination of each target with the percentage reduction formula. 
 
 
Table 2 summarizes allowed emissions and emissions reductions for each type of target 
under the nine 2008-2012 BAU alternatives, calculated by combining equation (1) and the formulae 
in Table 1. The equivalence among targets is guaranteed only when there is certainty on what would 
be the BAU scenario. However, at the moment the target is designed, emissions in the future are 
uncertain. Hence, abatement levels required by each type of target would be different and so would 
be their properties. 
As can be seen in Table 2, under a fixed target, there would be no effective commitment 
(i.e., A < 0) in the case of pessimistic scenarios (low growth of emissions linked to GDP and low or 
middle growth of agriculture sector emissions). In contrast, if the scenario were the most optimistic 
(high growth of emissions linked to GDP and of the agriculture sector), given EP fixed at the level 
that meets the commitment of 10% reduction (11.165 MTCE), the required A would represent 18% 
of EBAU. Therefore, on one hand, this alternative would have the disadvantages of risking “hot air” 
(achieving a fixed level of emissions might be extremely easy under low economic growth).
 On the 
other hand, achieving the fixed target might be extremely difficult under high economic growth 
(this occurs because A increases with increases in GDP). As a result, fixed allowed emission entail   7 
widely  varying  levels  of  emission  reductions  (a  high  dispersion)  among  the  nine  scenarios 
projections. 
 
Table 2. Allowed emissions and Abatement under alternative scenarios 
l 10% Fixed target q 11,165 Intensity I 0.23 SquareRoot K 151.5
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 100,485 -4,935 -5% 85,210 10,340 11% 92,533 3,017 3%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 100,485 4,715 4% 100,485 4,715 4% 100,485 4,715 4%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 100,485 21,815 18% 121,280 1,020 1% 110,394 11,906 10%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 100,485 -4,535 -5% 85,210 10,740 11% 92,533 3,417 4%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 100,485 1,915 2% 85,210 17,190 17% 92,533 9,867 10%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 100,485 4,315 4% 100,485 4,315 4% 100,485 4,315 4%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 100,485 11,165 10% 100,485 11,165 10% 100,485 11,165 10%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 100,485 14,965 13% 121,280 -5,830 -5% 110,394 5,056 4%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 100,485 15,365 13% 121,280 -5,430 -5% 110,394 5,456 5%
Mean 6.1% 5.4% 6.0%
Standard Deviation 0.081 0.075 0.029 
Notes: Effective λ denotes A*100/EBAU. Mean refers to the average of effective λ and Standard Deviation refers to the 
standard deviation of effective λ. 
   
 
These drawbacks of a fixed target led Argentina´s authorities to consider a second option: 
an emission intensity target. In this case, the target is dynamic instead of being fixed. The idea was 
that a target of this type would have the advantage -very valuable for a developing country like 
Argentina - that the greater the GDP, the greater would be the allowed emissions EP, (since it allows 
more emissions to fast-growing economies and fewer emissions to contracting ones). Nevertheless, 
one of the disadvantages of this option is that it does not contemplate the fact that, as in the case in 
Argentina, the agriculture sector does not depend strictly on the GDP. As a consequence, adopting a 
target based on this index implied that A becomes greater when there is less growth (less GDP) and 
less strict the greater the GDP (i.e., A varies negatively with respect to GDP). As the target would 
be  more  severe  in  low  economic  growth  situations  and  less  strict  in  high  economic  growth 
scenarios, there could also be circumstances in which there would be no commitment (or “hot air”). 
As can be seen in Table 2, on one hand, effective commitments would involve effective reductions 
of between 11 and 17% of the BAU emissions in the low GDP scenarios but there would be “hot 
air” up to approximately 5% of the BAU emissions in the high GDP scenarios. This happens while 
the dispersion among scenarios remains almost constant (standard deviation among scenarios only 
changes from 0.081 to 0.075 when an intensity target –instead of a fixed target- is adopted).  
  All those characteristics of fixed and linear GDP targets (the presence of “hot air”, the 
negative relationship between A and GDP, and the high dispersion) lead Argentina´s technical team   8 
to propose an alternative: a “square root target”. That type of target was a way to consider the fact 
that emissions in Argentina did not vary linearly with the GDP. Under the square root rule, as 
shown in Table 2, it remains valid that the greater the GDP, the greater would be allowed emissions. 
In addition, there would no be generation of “hot air” in any case, the target becomes more stringent 
in high growth scenarios (effective reductions of 10% or 11.9 thousand of MTCE in the high GDP-
high agriculture Sector scenario) and less stringent in low growth scenarios (effective reductions of 
approximately 3% or 3 thousand MTCE in low GDP – low or middle agriculture sector-), and the 
dispersion would be considerably lower (standard deviation drops from 0.075 to 0.029).  
 
II. 3. More on Argentina´s “square root” target metric 
 
The “square root” formula caused some surprise back in 1999 since at that time the main discussion 
was around a directly proportional indexation between emissions and GDP (see Baumert et al., 
1999). Alternatives target options in the last decade consider a less than proportionate indexation to 
GDP. More precisely, the general formula for an intensity target is now (see Kim and Baumert 2002 
and Herzog et al., 2005): 
 
p E Z GDP
b = ×                              (2) 
 
where β determines the extent to which allowed emissions increase in response to GDP changes. If 
β = 1, as GDP increases, allowed emissions increase to the same extent. If β < 1, when GDP 
increases, allowed emissions increase at a lower rate.  
The value of the indexation parameter (β) can be determined by econometric models. For 
example, Lutter (2000) modeling emissions with data for CO2 in 86 countries as of function of 5-
years lagged emissions, lagged GDP and lagged GDP per capita (all expressed in logarithms) and a 
constant, established a “universal” indexation parameter of 0.6. This means that a 1 % increase in 
GDP of a 5 years period is associated with a 0.6% increase in emissions over the subsequent 5 years 
period.  Similarly,  Jotzo  and  Pezzey  (2007)  using  a  18-regions  and  countries  simulation  model 
derived an optimal degree of indexation less than one for most developing countries. Jotzo and 
Pezzey (2007) derive an indexation of 0.6 for the particular case of Argentina. Both studies are in 
line with the “square root” approach chosen by Argentina at the time its target was defined: a 
special case of the general emission intensity target with an indexation to GDP of 0.5.    9 
  Hence, nowadays, by simply using GHG emission data from 1990 to 2005, it is possible to 
reconfirm that result for Argentina by estimating the following simple logarithmic transformation of 
(1) by ordinary least squares: 
 













is the GDP elasticity of emissions, α is a constant and  t m is the error term 
that reflects all those factors (different from GDP) that affect GHG emissions.  
 
Table 3. Regression analysis to reconfirm the validity of the square root rule 
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error
ln(GDP) 0.589 *** 0.105 0.420 *** 0.158
Cons 5.141 *** 1.310 7.159 *** 1.970
Adj R-squared
N





Note: *** represents 1% statistical significance. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the elasticity coefficients go from about 0.4 to 0.6 in the model 
with and without LULUCF respectively. These results suggest that a parameter of 0.5 for GDP 




III.  Consequences of changing key assumptions of the target design 
 
In  terms  of  GDP,  Argentina  projections  from  1997  to  2012  are  not  so  far  from  the  observed 
evolution over the period 1997-2010. Figure 2 shows the Argentina’s GDP in 1993 million of pesos 
together with the low (2.3%), middle (3.6%) and high (5.1%) growth scenarios projections. The 
1997-2010  average  annual  growth  is  3.4%,  which  lies  between  the  low  and  middle  scenarios 
(INDEC, 2011). This result supports the middle GDP reference scenario chosen for the target. Note 
that if Argentina´s institutional problems in 2001 and the world economic crisis in 2009 (both 
unexpected events in 1999) were excluded, the average growth over the period would have been 
considerably higher. Hence, it is possible to say that the target designer was relatively accurate with 
                                                 
6 This result is confirmed by the nonparametric Spearman correlation coefficient with a r=0.80 (p-value=0.002) in the 
model without the LULUCF sector and a r=0.66 (p-value=0.002) in the other model.   10 
respect  to  Argentina´s  expected  economic  evolution,  but  not  necessarily  for  the  right  reasons. 
Experts in charge of the target construction could have never forecasted the major 2009 economic 
crisis. It was almost by coincidence that the average GDP growth rate felt within the range of 
forecasted growth. 
 



































Real Low Middle High Real Average growth  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on GDP projections (UCEMA, FIEL and FLACSO) and realized GDP (INDEC). 
 
 
A question that derives from observing reality and forecast is what would have happened if 
another reference scenario had been taken as the “most likely”. It may be the case that some of the 
target properties (regarding the possibility or not of “hot air” and eventually the dispersion among 
scenarios) may change.
7 If that was the case, the preference of one form of target over another 
metric  may  change.  The  importance  of  this  analysis  is  that  it  refers  to  another  dimension  of 
uncertainty, not the ex-post dispersion, but the ex-ante lack of knowledge of economic development 
and emission path. The former refers to the fact that once the target is defined (based on the most 
likely growth scenario), economic development in the future is uncertain, hence under dynamic 
targets, the reduction effort is variable and unknown. The latter uncertainty refers to how the change 
                                                 
7 The relationship between A and GDP does not change when other scenarios are taken as reference.   11 
in the planner forecast of the most likely scenario affects the possible range of emissions reductions. 
The target functioning depends on actual outcomes relative to expectations at the time the target is 
set. More precisely, as it was shown in Table 1, the target functioning depends on both actual GDP 
and on the reference scenario chosen to set the target. So, different choices regarding the BAU 
scenario (and as detailed below, of the stringency parameter λ) affect the target design. To develop a 
sense of how important this issue could be, we simulate this dimension of uncertainty by varying 
the reference BAU scenario and λ.  
 
IV.1. Reference scenarios 
 
As it was shown above, with λ =10% and considering the middle GDP growth and high agriculture 
scenario  as  the  reference  (more  likely)  BAU  scenario,  Argentina’s  target  takes  the  following 
form: GDP K E p × = , with K= 151.5. But, it could have been the case that the scenario was not 
forecasted in this way by the technical team because they simply made a mistake in their “best 
guessing” procedure.  
Table 4 shows, with the same stringency parameter (l =10%) but changing the scenario 
taken as the reference, the number of situation for which “hot air” arises and the standard deviation 
of the effective effort (Appendix A shows these results in the same format as Table 2). This is 
useful to compare how those two main characteristics (of each type of target) change when the other 
scenarios (different from middle GDP and high agriculture) are projected as the most probable in 
the future. 
It is clear from Table 4 that, if the target planner chooses a different scenario, “hot air” still 
appear (but for different rules). In particular, there would be “hot air” under the fixed target rule if a 
high GDP had been forecasted and “hot air” would appear only under a linear intensity target if low 
GDP scenarios had been taken as the reference. Under the “square root” rule “hot air” would have 
not occurred in any case even if the planner had been mistaken in terms of what was the most likely 
scenario.  
  Seconly, we find that the ranking of dispersion in reduction efforts among the three targets 
is robust to changes of the reference scenario from middle GDP to high GDP. But, that is not the 
case when low GDP scenarios are taken as the most likely. In effect, as can be seen in Table 4, 
intensity target standard deviation is higher than under the fixed target when low GDP growth is 
projected as the most likely situation. This result is in line with those who argue that intensity 
targets do not always reduce uncertainty (Sue Wing et al. 2009 and Marschinski and Edenhofer   12 
2010, for example). More precisely, in some circumstances (if emissions and GDP are weakly 
positively correlated or the uncertainty about future GDP is much larger than the uncertainty about 
future emissions), fixed targets could produce less variance in outcomes than intensity caps. This is 
what can be occurring in the case of Argentina, because as stated above the agriculture sector plays 
a strong role in emissions, but its evolution depends more on weather and other conditions than on 
the country´s own economic development.  
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Nevertheless, it can be affirmed that while fixed and intensity targets´ properties (regarding 
the presence or lack of hot air and the dispersion of the effective reduction) change when different 
scenarios are taken as the most likely, this is not the case for the “square root” type target. Its 
properties (lack  of  hot  air,  lower  effort  dispersion among  probable future  scenarios,  a  positive 
relationship between allowed emissions and GDP and between emissions reduction and GDP) are 
maintained even if the target designer mistakenly chooses a different scenario than the one chosen 
by Argentina´s target team in 1999. Again, this is consistent with the literature since, as shown in 
Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003) and Sue Wing et al. (2009), generalized intensity targets (which link 
emissions to GDP with an elasticity less than 1, as is the case of the Argentinean “square root” 
target)  always  reduce  uncertainty  with  respect  to  fixed  targets  provided  there  is  a  positive 
correlation between emissions and GDP. 
Finally, these results confirm also the point raised by Marschinski and Edenhofer (2010) 
that the probability of “hot air” is larger for the target that exhibits higher variance. Here, when low 
GDP scenarios are taken as the reference ones, uncertainty is larger under intensity targets than 
under  fixed  targets,  and  it  is  possible  to  see  that  some  “hot  air”  situations  happens  under  the   13 
intensity target and not under the fixed target. Moreover, since in our particular case, to avoid “hot 
air”,  the  following  conditions  have  to  hold  for  fixed,  intensity  and  “square  root”  targets 
respectively:  
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We confirm that if the uncertainty about future GDP is much higher than uncertainty about future 
emissions (intuitively, this means that the deviation of  BAU GDP with respect to 
BAU
R GDP is higher 
than that of  BAU E with respect to
BAU
R E ), then a coupling of the target to GDP will introduce more 
new uncertainty than can be reduced. However, as stated in Sue Wing et al. (2009), we also find 
here that the (β=1/2) parameter contributes to avoid “hot air” since it reduces the likelihood of 
finding hot air by neutralizing the uncertainty with respect to future GDP (the right-hand side term 
of the above equation). 
 
III.2. Level of the Target 
 
Regarding the level of the target, as has been mentioned above, the decision of the Argentine 
government had been to adopt a reduction of 10% of GHG emissions with respect to the BAU 
scenario (middle GDP- high Agriculture growth). There are two main reasons for this decision:  the 
first one had to do with the fact that the options for mitigation that were studied would enable the 
fulfillment of that commitment. The second motive is that this 10% reduction results in a positive 
relationship between A(t) and GDP(t) (and entails no possibility of  “hot air”). As stated in Barros 
and Conte Grand (2002, p. 567-568) if, for example, a mitigation of only 5% were made with 
respect to the reference scenario, the target would not be valid since there would be no effective 
commitment (except in the most optimistic scenario) scenario.  
  To be here more precise, in order to fulfill the A > 0 condition, λ has to satisfy the following 
conditions for fixed, intensity and “square root” targets respectively: 
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and  so  they  will  be  different  for  different  reference  scenarios.  But,  it  will  also  change 
depending on the metric used for the target, as is made clear by the different equations in 










When the square root is applied, the GDP relationship in the square root rule is lower than 
that of the intensity rule, so l needs to be higher under the square root rule than under the 
intensity one.  
Now, for the case of Argentina, for the fixed target condition (5) requires that l > 14.42% 
under the reference scenario.  For the most pessimist scenario, the condition is met for any l > 0, 
while for the most optimistic, the condition is fulfilled for l > 21.87%. For the intensity target, in 
order to avoid “hot air”, the following inequalities have to hold: l > 14.33% for the reference 
scenario, l > 15.11%, for the most pessimist scenario, and l > 5.60% for the most optimistic 
situation. Finally, for the “square root” rule, the no “hot air” condition requires that l > 7.07% for 
the reference scenario, the condition is met for any l > 0 for the most pessimist scenario, while for 
the most optimistic it holds for l > 6.79%.  
  In summary, the characteristics of the “square root“ target regarding “hot air” were sensible 
to the level of the stringency chosen, but this was again not the case for the condition that links 
positively emissions reductions and GDP. While more precisely stated here, this weakness of the 
Argentina´s target was known and already pointed out in Barros and Conte Grand (2002). This 
point also appears in the related literature. In effect, as Marschinski and Edenhofer (2010) make 
clear, target  probabilities of  generating  “hot air”  is  smaller the  more stringent  is  the  reduction 
envisaged by that target. 
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IV.  Argentina´s GHG emissions evolution and the proposed target 
 
As stated above, Argentina ultimately abandoned its proposal for multiple reasons. However, an 
interesting question is to explore what would have happened if the target had been binding.  
Regarding  the  evolution  of  emissions,  Argentina´s  authorities  presented  the  Second 
National  Communication  (2NC)  to  the  UNFCCC  in  March  2008  (SAyDS,  2008).  This 
communication contains GHG inventory information for the year 2000, and small readjustments of 
the  1990,  1994  and  1997  emissions.
8  There  is  more  than  a  5  years  lag  in  GHG  emissions 
inventories. Although there are no official figures for current emissions, there are estimations from 
a  private  study  over  the  period  1990-2005  (see  Proyecto  Endesa-Cemsa/Fundación  Bariloche, 
2008). Reported emissions from the two alternative sources are in line with those in CAIT-WRI 
(Climate Analysis Indicator Tool, Version 8.0). For example, emissions reported in the 2NC, in the 
the study of Fundación Bariloche (FB), and the CAIT-WRI database for the year 2000 are 76.9, 
73.2 and 81.4 MTCE respectively. Figure 3 shows the differences in past emissions among the 
alternative sources. 
 
Figure  3.  Alternative  calculations  for  Argentina´s  GHG  emissions  (all  gases  without 
LUCLUFs) and allowed emissions for 2008-2010 under the square root target 
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Note: Own elaboration based on data of 2NC (2008), ENDESA-CEMSA, FB(2008) and CAIT-WRI (version 8.0). 
                                                 
8  In  accordance  with  UNFCCC  recommendations  and  with  IPCC  guidelines,  emissions  in  the  Second  National 
Communication were measured in Gg of CO2 equivalent instead of MTCE as was the case in the previous inventories. 
Here,  to  maintain  homogeneity  in  units,  we  express  emissions  in  terms  of  MTCE,  where  1  Gg  CO2 
equivalent=1000*MTCE*44/12.   16 
However, it is possible to show in the same graph how much would have been the average 
annual allowed emissions for 2008-2012 if the target had been binding. Knowing the GDP for 2008, 
2009 and 2010, it is possible to calculate average allowed emissions for those three years: 95.4 
MTCE. As can be seen in Figure 3, if over the period 2008-2010 Argentina´s GHG emissions 
follow the trend given CAIT-WRI, there could be a strong risk of not fulfilling the target when the 
commitment  period  arrives  (projected  emissions  are  101.9  MTCE,  greater  than  the  allowed 
emissions under the square root target). However, if the average annual emissions are forecasted 
using inventories built with local data (as the 2NC and FB), the commitment (if binding) could be 
met (projected emissions are 87.5 MTCE and 92.4 MTCE respectively).
9   
Finally, if the technical team in charge of planning the target had taken a different scenario 
as the most likely, emissions projected based on the 2NC would always be below the allowed ones, 
emissions predicted based on CAIT-WRI would always be above the GDP related emissions by 
under the square root rule, while FB estimated emissions will be above or below the allowed ones 
depending on which was the scenario taken as the most likely one. 
    
V.  Conclusions 
 
Argentina is among the 25 largest contributors to climate change, despite its participation of less 
than 1% in overall GHG emissions. In part because of that, Argentina proposed a voluntary GHG 
reduction target to the Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Climate Change Convention 
in 1999. Argentina´s target was an innovation at the time it was formulated, since it was the first 
time a developing country proposed to commit to a quantifiable GHG reduction. But also because 
its target was linked to GDP and as a result the higher/lower the GDP, the greater/smaller would be 
allowable emissions. It was pointed out that Argentina´s target had two additional characteristics: its 
metric would not represent a restriction for the country’s development (required abatement would 
be lower in low economic growth situations and more stringent in high economic growth scenarios) 
and it would eliminate the possibility of “hot air”. 
However,  when  reconsidering  the  target  after  some  time,  it  is  now  clear  that  all  the 
supposedly attractive properties of Argentina´s target vis a vis a fixed and a linear intensity target 
are robust to changes in its main parameter values or model assumptions. However, what do vary 
(when some parameters are modified) are the relative properties of fixed and linear intensity rules. 
More specifically, for the case of Argentina, it was shown that the possibility of having hot air 
                                                 
9 It is important to mention that the forecast based on the FB trend is more robust than the others since, due to information 
availability, this projection considers more observations (16 observations of GHG emissions against 4 observations for 
2NC and 3 for CAIT-WRI).   17 
under fixed and intensity targets do depend on the choice of a particular baseline scenario. In 
particular, negative abatement occur under low GDP scenarios for the fixed target while hot air 
arise under high GDP reference scenarios for the simple intensity format. Related to this issue, 
depending on the scenario taken as the most likely, the dispersion of effective reduction resulting 
from fixed and intensity targets can be lower or higher. In other words, if low GDP scenarios were 
taken as reference, an intensity target would result in higher dispersion in effective efforts than 
under a fixed target. While this happens, “square root” target properties (lack of hot air, a lower 
effort dispersion among probable future scenarios with respect to fixed and intensity targets, a 
positive relationship between allowed emissions and GDP and between emissions reduction and 
GDP) are maintained even if the target designer mistakenly chooses a different scenario than the 
one chosen in 1999. Finally, as was already acknowledged in Barros and Conte Grand (2002), the 
properties of the square root target (in particular, the appearance of hot air) are sensitive to the level 
of stringency chosen (i.e, the proposed annual average emissions reduction for 2008-2012). What 
we document here with more detail is the extent of that sensitivity. 
Despite those allegedly positive aspects, Argentina never pursued the intention to adopt a 
GHG target beyond the COP 5 meeting. Hence, it cannot be discussed how it actually worked in 
reality. The country’s exact amount of what would have been allowable emissions under the target 
will only be known several years past the end of the period 2008-2012, since there is a 5 year lag in 
Argentina´s  GHG  inventories.  Notwithstanding,  taking  “middle  commitment  period  year” 
projections (2010), it has been shown that there would be a risk of not fulfilled the commitment (if 
binding) when using national data (Argentina´s National Communication and a study from a local 
institution  -Fundación  Bariloche-),  but  this  is  not  the  case  when  the  trend  is  calculated  using 
international  data  (WRI-CAIT).    Maintaining  the  square  root  rule,  but  changing  the  reference 
scenario, this results is not as robust since emissions projections using local data in some cases are 
higher than the limit imposed by the square root target calculated for the average 2008-2010 GDP. 
Once again, it is possible to assess that targets do depend on design assumptions.  
There is no doubt that revisiting Argentina´s proposal after a decade has passed since it was 
designed, and after the literature on intensity targets has evolved, represents a concrete and valuable 
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Annex  
Table A.1. Sensitivity of targets to the reference scenario 
 
l 10% Fixed target q 9,555 Intensity I 0.23 SquareRoot K 140.8
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 85,995 9,555 10% 85,995 9,555 10% 85,995 9,555 10%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 85,995 19,205 18% 101,411 3,789 4% 93,385 11,815 11%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 85,995 36,305 30% 122,398 -98 0% 102,594 19,706 16%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 85,995 9,955 10% 85,995 9,955 10% 85,995 9,955 10%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 85,995 16,405 16% 85,995 16,405 16% 85,995 16,405 16%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 85,995 18,805 18% 101,411 3,389 3% 93,385 11,415 11%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 85,995 25,655 23% 101,411 10,239 9% 93,385 18,265 16%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 85,995 29,455 26% 122,398 -6,948 -6% 102,594 12,856 11%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 85,995 29,855 26% 122,398 -6,548 -6% 102,594 13,256 11% 
l 10% Fixed target q 12,230 Intensity I 0.21 SquareRoot K 151.1
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 110,070 -14,520 -15% 77,333 18,217 19% 92,261 3,289 3%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 110,070 -4,870 -5% 91,197 14,003 13% 100,190 5,010 5%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 110,070 12,230 10% 110,070 12,230 10% 110,070 12,230 10%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 110,070 -14,120 -15% 77,333 18,617 19% 92,261 3,689 4%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 110,070 -7,670 -7% 77,333 25,067 24% 92,261 10,139 10%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 110,070 -5,270 -5% 91,197 13,603 13% 100,190 4,610 4%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 110,070 1,580 1% 91,197 20,453 18% 100,190 11,460 10%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 110,070 5,380 5% 110,070 5,380 5% 110,070 5,380 5%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 110,070 5,780 5% 110,070 5,780 5% 110,070 5,780 5% 
Note: EBAU, EP and A are expressed in MTCEx1000. 
   21 
l 10% Fixed target q 10,520 Intensity I 0.22 SquareRoot K 142.7
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 94,680 870 1% 80,287 15,263 16% 87,187 8,363 9%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 94,680 10,520 10% 94,680 10,520 10% 94,680 10,520 10%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 94,680 27,620 23% 114,274 8,026 7% 104,017 18,283 15%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 94,680 1,270 1% 80,287 15,663 16% 87,187 8,763 9%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 94,680 7,720 8% 80,287 22,113 22% 87,187 15,213 15%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 94,680 10,120 10% 94,680 10,120 10% 94,680 10,120 10%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 94,680 16,970 15% 94,680 16,970 15% 94,680 16,970 15%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 94,680 20,770 18% 114,274 1,176 1% 104,017 11,433 10%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 94,680 21,170 18% 114,274 1,576 1% 104,017 11,833 10%
l 10% Fixed target q 9,595 Intensity I 0.23 SquareRoot K 141.4
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 86,355 9,195 10% 86,355 9,195 10% 86,355 9,195 10%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 86,355 18,845 18% 101,836 3,364 3% 93,776 11,424 11%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 86,355 35,945 29% 122,911 -611 0% 103,024 19,276 16%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 86,355 9,595 10% 86,355 9,595 10% 86,355 9,595 10%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 86,355 16,045 16% 86,355 16,045 16% 86,355 16,045 16%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 86,355 18,445 18% 101,836 2,964 3% 93,776 11,024 11%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 86,355 25,295 23% 101,836 9,814 9% 93,776 17,874 16%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 86,355 29,095 25% 122,911 -7,461 -6% 103,024 12,426 11%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 86,355 29,495 25% 122,911 -7,061 -6% 103,024 12,826 11%
l 10% Fixed target q 10,240 Intensity I 0.25 SquareRoot K 150.9
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 92,160 3,390 4% 92,160 3,390 4% 92,160 3,390 4%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 92,160 13,040 12% 108,681 -3,481 -3% 100,080 5,120 5%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 92,160 30,140 25% 131,173 -8,873 -7% 109,949 12,351 10%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 92,160 3,790 4% 92,160 3,790 4% 92,160 3,790 4%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 92,160 10,240 10% 92,160 10,240 10% 92,160 10,240 10%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 92,160 12,640 12% 108,681 -3,881 -4% 100,080 4,720 5%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 92,160 19,490 17% 108,681 2,969 3% 100,080 11,570 10%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 92,160 23,290 20% 131,173 -15,723 -14% 109,949 5,501 5%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 92,160 23,690 20% 131,173 -15,323 -13% 109,949 5,901 5%
l 10% Fixed target q 10,480 Intensity I 0.21 SquareRoot K 142.2
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 94,320 1,230 1% 79,982 15,568 16% 86,856 8,694 9%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 94,320 10,880 10% 94,320 10,880 10% 94,320 10,880 10%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 94,320 27,980 23% 113,840 8,460 7% 103,621 18,679 15%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 94,320 1,630 2% 79,982 15,968 17% 86,856 9,094 9%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 94,320 8,080 8% 79,982 22,418 22% 86,856 15,544 15%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 94,320 10,480 10% 94,320 10,480 10% 94,320 10,480 10%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 94,320 17,330 16% 94,320 17,330 16% 94,320 17,330 16%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 94,320 21,130 18% 113,840 1,610 1% 103,621 11,829 10%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 94,320 21,530 19% 113,840 2,010 2% 103,621 12,229 11%
l 10% Fixed target q 11,545 Intensity I 0.20 SquareRoot K 142.6
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 103,905 -8,355 -9% 73,002 22,548 24% 87,093 8,457 9%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 103,905 1,295 1% 86,089 19,111 18% 94,578 10,622 10%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 103,905 18,395 15% 103,905 18,395 15% 103,905 18,395 15%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 103,905 -7,955 -8% 73,002 22,948 24% 87,093 8,857 9%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 103,905 -1,505 -1% 73,002 29,398 29% 87,093 15,307 15%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 103,905 895 1% 86,089 18,711 18% 94,578 10,222 10%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 103,905 7,745 7% 86,089 25,561 23% 94,578 17,072 15%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 103,905 11,545 10% 103,905 11,545 10% 103,905 11,545 10%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 103,905 11,945 10% 103,905 11,945 10% 103,905 11,945 10%
l 10% Fixed target q 11,585 Intensity I 0.20 SquareRoot K 143.1
EBAU avg E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l E P A Eff. l
2008 to 2012
Scenarios MTCE*1000
LowGDP-LowAgr 95,550 104,265 -8,715 -9% 73,255 22,295 23% 87,395 8,155 9%
MiddleGDP-MiddleAgr 105,200 104,265 935 1% 86,387 18,813 18% 94,906 10,294 10%
HighGDP-HighAgr 122,300 104,265 18,035 15% 104,265 18,035 15% 104,265 18,035 15%
LowGDP-MiddleAgr 95,950 104,265 -8,315 -9% 73,255 22,695 24% 87,395 8,555 9%
LowGDP-HighAgr 102,400 104,265 -1,865 -2% 73,255 29,145 28% 87,395 15,005 15%
MiddleGDP-LowAgr 104,800 104,265 535 1% 86,387 18,413 18% 94,906 9,894 9%
MiddleGDP-HighAgr 111,650 104,265 7,385 7% 86,387 25,263 23% 94,906 16,744 15%
HighGDP-LowAgr 115,450 104,265 11,185 10% 104,265 11,185 10% 104,265 11,185 10%
HighGDP-MiddleAgr 115,850 104,265 11,585 10% 104,265 11,585 10% 104,265 11,585 10%  
Note: EBAU, EP and A are expressed in MTCEx1000. 